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Extinction serves as the leading theoretical framework and experimental model to describe how learned
behaviors diminish through absence of anticipated reinforcement. In the past decade, extinction has moved
beyond the realm of associative learning theory and behavioral experimentation in animals and has become
a topic of considerable interest in the neuroscience of learning, memory, and emotion. Here, we review
research and theories of extinction, both as a learning process and as a behavioral technique, and consider
whether traditional understandings warrant a re-examination. We discuss the neurobiology, cognitive fac-
tors, and major computational theories, and revisit the predominant view that extinction results in new
learning that interferes with expression of the original memory. Additionally, we reconsider the limitations
of extinction as a technique to prevent the relapse of maladaptive behavior and discuss novel approaches,
informed by contemporary theoretical advances, that augment traditional extinction methods to target and
potentially alter maladaptive memories.Introduction
Along with the discovery of the conditioned response (CR), one
of Pavlov’s most significant contributions to physiology and to
psychological science was the observation that absence of rein-
forcement resulted in a weakening or disappearance of acquired
behavior. Termed by Pavlov as the ‘‘internal inhibition of condi-
tioned reflexes’’ (Pavlov, 1927), experimental extinction gener-
ated theoretical and empirical research interest throughout the
20th century, but research on extinction paled in comparison to
studies of conditions that generate acquisition of CRs. In the
past decade, however, there has been a surge of interest in
experimental extinction for its own sake. The topic spans neuro-
behavioral studies in laboratory animals and humans, cellular,
molecular and genetic research, and computational learning
models. Beyond interest in the basic mechanisms of learning
and memory, renewed attention to extinction is due in large
part to the clinical significance of extinction for the treatment of
a variety of psychiatric disorders (Milad and Quirk, 2012; Vervliet
et al., 2013). Specifically, extinction serves as the basis for expo-
sure-based therapy, a primary treatment for anxiety disorders,
addiction, and trauma- and stress-related disorders (Powers
et al., 2010). Experimental extinction is also considered within
the National Institute of Mental Health’s Research Domain
Criteria as a scientific paradigm to provide objective neurobeha-
vioral measures of mental illness in the domain of Negative
Affect. It is hoped that advances in our understanding of extinc-
tion across multiple fronts will translate to new, effective treat-
ments for psychiatric conditions characterized by the inability
to regulate pathological fear or anxiety.
The purpose of this Perspective is to consider how the view
of extinction has changed as new findings have emerged and
to discuss new directions and unanswered questions in this
burgeoning field. Notably, research and theory on extinction is
immense. This article covers what we believe are significant
themes relevant for understanding how the fields of computa-tional learning theory and the neuroscience of learning, memory,
and emotion view extinction. Throughout this Perspective, we
attempt to delineate between where there is consensus (Box 1)
and where there are theoretical or practical gaps in our under-
standing (Box 2).
The first section is composed of a brief background on the
theoretical foundation uponwhich contemporary views of extinc-
tion rest, a description of the neurobiology of extinction, psycho-
logical factors, andmajor associative learning models. A primary
question is whether the mechanisms supporting extinction
involve new learning that inhibits or interferes with original
learning, as is the current mainstay, or also cause erasure of the
original learning, as suggested by recent theoretical and experi-
mental work. In particular, we survey a recent framework that re-
interprets extinction in terms of sound statistical reasoning about
the causes of events in the world, and suggest that this frame-
work can conceptualize the trade-off between new learning and
memory modification. In the second section, we detail the short-
falls of traditional extinction techniques in preventing the return of
unwanted behaviors and discuss novel approaches to augment
extinction that compensate for these shortfalls. We attempt to
understand the success of these approaches in terms of several
distinct theoretical mechanisms, including interference and
erasure, which might contribute to extinction. Of note, we focus
almost exclusively on extinction in the domain of fear or threat
conditioning, as it is in this arena that many of the advances in
neuroscience, behavior, learning theory, and clinical translational
research have been made.
Foundational Research and Theories of Extinction
The canonical expression of experimental extinction rests on
Pavlovian conditioning, in which a conditional stimulus (CS;
e.g., a tone or light) is paired with a naturally salient unconditional
stimulus (US; e.g., food or an electric shock). Once a relationship
between the CS and US is established, presentation of the CSNeuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 47
Box 1. Current Status of the Field
d Return of extinguished behavior is common following the
passage of time (‘‘spontaneous recovery’’), when extin-
guished cues are encountered outside the extinction
context (‘‘contextual renewal’’), and after presentation of
the unconditioned stimulus (‘‘reinstatement’’). These ef-
fects provide support for the widely held view that extinc-
tion is a new form of learning and that conditioning and
extinction memories may coexist in distinct neural circuits
and be reactivated independently based on environmental
or situational factors.
d Contemporary computational models have been devel-
oped to reflect the understanding that extinction is not sim-
ply a change (decrease) in a previously learned value.
Accordingly, they augment such learning with the possibil-
ity that extinctionmay also arise when a new ‘‘state’’ (or as-
sociation) is created, for which a new value is learned.
d Neurobiological models of extinction focus on interactions
between and processes within the medial prefrontal cor-
tex, amygdala, and hippocampus. This basic neurocircui-
try appears to be conserved across species.
d The principles of extinction serve as the basis for clinical
treatments such as exposure-based therapy, which is
considered an effective treatment for a host of anxiety dis-
orders, as well as addiction.
Box 2. Future Directions
d Under what conditions is a fear memory retrieved and up-
dated, as opposed to a new extinctionmemory trace being
laid down? Computationally, the question is what are the
factors that determine when a new state (or latent cause)
of the associative learning task will be inferred, versus
retrieval and updating of an old state?
d What is the neurobiological signature of updating of a
persistent memory, and what are the necessary and suffi-
cient conditions to demonstrate that a memory has been
persistently altered?
d Contemporary studies of extinction of instrumental condi-
tioning, including extinction of avoidance behaviors, have
received far too little attention, and should be integrated
into a general picture of learning and unlearning in the
brain.
d What is the role of predisposing genetic and epigenetic
variants associated with extinction learning? To what
extent do individual differences such as early life stress,
trait anxiety, and intolerance of uncertainty moderate
extinction and extinction retention in humans?
d Are extinction deficits a diagnostic biomarker of trauma
and stressor-related disorders like PTSD and clinical anx-
iety disorders such as obsessive compulsive, generalized
anxiety, and panic disorders?
d Howwill techniques that appear to persistently alter condi-
tioned threat memories in non-human animals translate to
complex fear memories in humans? For instance, invasive
techniques like blocking protein synthesis in the amygdala
during consolidation or reconsolidation of a threat memory
appear effective for simple associative memories like a
tone-shock pairing, but under what circumstances will
they be effective for traumatic memories such as those
implicated in PTSD? Relatedly, do noninvasive behavioral
techniques that effectively eliminate the conditioned
response translate to more generalized threat memories
or human emotional episodic memories, and if so, what
are the boundary conditions that define when these tech-
niques will and when they will not be useful?
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the domain of fear conditioning, in which the US is naturally
unpleasant or painful, the CR often takes the form of defensive
behaviors or emotional reactions such as increases in sweating,
heart rate, pupil size, freezing, and blood pressure. With
continuing presentation of the CS in the absence of the US,
the CR gradually diminishes or is eliminated altogether.
Contemporary theoretical views of extinction are in many
ways based directly on early formulations by Pavlov (Pavlov,
1927). Pavlov interpreted extinction as a form of ‘‘internal inhibi-
tion’’ (as opposed to decreases in the CR resulting from the pres-
ence of another stimulus, which he termed ‘‘external inhibition’’).
According to Pavlov, extinction disrupts the CR but does not
destroy it. Evidence that the CR is preserved comes from the
fact that it tends to return over time, what Pavlov termed ‘‘spon-
taneous recovery’’ or restoration. Pavlov (1927) considered
spontaneous recovery to be a measure of the depth of the
extinction process itself: ‘‘[Extinction] is measured, other condi-
tions being equal, by the time taken for spontaneous restoration
of the extinguished reflex to its original strength’’ (p. 58). Other
evidence for the persistence of the original CS-US association
includes ‘‘contextual renewal’’ (the return of the CR if tested in
a different context), ‘‘reinstatement’’ (the return of the CR when
tested after a reminder US), and ‘‘rapid reacquisition’’ (rapid
re-learning of the CS-US association) (Box 1).
Of theoretical import is the question of what occurs during
extinction that reduces the CR. For Pavlov, the central mecha-
nism involved inhibitory properties accruing to the CS over the
course of extinction training, a process putatively subserved
by inhibitory cells in the cortex (notably, Pavlov’s references to48 Neuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.the CNS were vague). The notion that the CS acquires inhibitory
properties that suppress the CR is still the predominant view of
extinction (e.g., Bouton et al., 2006; Larrauri and Schmajuk,
2008), though theories on the nature of inhibitory learning vary,
as detailed below.
The obvious alternative formulation to inhibition is that of
erasure or modification of the original CS-US associative mem-
ory. Erasure seems a less tenable mechanism overall, simply
because spontaneous recovery is so common following tradi-
tional extinction. However, some early theories proposed that
erasure (or, at least, partial erasure) does play a role in the extinc-
tion process. For instance, Razran (1956) proposed a two-stage
process of extinction in which the early stage consists of partial
erasure (or ‘‘de-conditioning’’) resulting from a loss of feedback
and the later stage consists of new learning that counteracts the
residual excitatory CR.
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rarely complete (Delamater and Westbrook, 2014); that is, the
CR does not return to its original level and rapidly re-extin-
guishes. This may suggest some partial erasure of original
learning. However, since affirmative signatures of memory
erasure or modification do not currently exist, weakened recov-
ery might in principle reflect strengthened inhibitory learning and
not erasure (see Box 2). It is also important to consider that a CS-
US association likely involves multiple independent components
(sensory/perceptual, emotional, temporal, conceptual, etc.)
(Brandon et al., 2000; Delamater, 2012a, 2012b). Fear extinction
may reduce emotional elements, while leaving other associa-
tions (e.g., sensory) intact. Evidence of extinction is therefore
sensitive to the specific choice of which behavioral response
to assay at the time of test (Delamater andWestbrook, 2014; Lat-
tal and Wood, 2013), and effective extinction may only mimic
erasure by eliminating a conditioned fear response, while leaving
other elements of the CS-US association intact. In short, it is
possible that extinction simultaneously erases, inhibits, and
has no effect on separate aspects of the same memory.
Neurobiology of Fear Extinction
Studies investigating the neural mechanisms of fear conditioning
across species indicate that the amygdala is critical for the
acquisition, storage, and expression of conditioned fear (see Le-
Doux, 2000 for review). The lateral nucleus of the amygdala (LA)
is thought to be the site of synaptic plasticity that encodes the
association between CS and US sensory inputs. In the presence
of the CS, the LA excites the central nucleus (CE), which medi-
ates CR expression through projections to the brainstem and hy-
pothalamus. The LA also indirectly projects to the CE through the
basal nucleus and the intercalated (ITC) cell masses (clusters of
inhibitory GABAergic neurons). The basal nucleus itself also pro-
jects directly to the ITC. These pathways provide multiple poten-
tial circuits for gating fear expression in extinction. Research
in rodents using lesions, pharmacological manipulations, and
electrophysiology provide an increasingly detailed model of the
neural circuitry of fear extinction. This research suggests that
interactions between of the amygdala, the ventral medial
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), and the hippocampus support the
acquisition, storage, retrieval, and contextual modulation of
fear extinction (see Milad and Quirk, 2012 for review).
Pharmacological and electrophysiological studies in rodents
suggest that the amygdala, in addition to its role in the acquisi-
tion and expression of conditioned fear, also plays a role in the
acquisition and consolidation of fear extinction. For instance,
blockade of NMDA in the LA (Sotres-Bayon et al., 2007) or gluta-
mate (Kim et al., 2007) receptors within the basolateral amygdala
complex (BLA) impairs extinction learning, and the blockade of
mitogen-activated protein kinase (MAPk) activity in the BLA
entirely prevents the acquisition of extinction (Herry et al.,
2006). Furthermore, several studies suggest that the consolida-
tion of extinction learning is supported by morphological
changes in synapses of the BLA (Chhatwal et al., 2005). Consis-
tent with the notion that extinction results in new learning, not
erasure of the original fear memory, a population of neurons in
the LA have been identified in which the CS response is main-
tained despite a decrease in the expression of conditioned fearwith extinction, along with a second more transiently responsive
population (Repa et al., 2001). This finding provides further evi-
dence that the amygdala supports the maintenance of the orig-
inal fear memory while simultaneously facilitating extinction
learning (see Hartley and Phelps, 2010 for review).
Although the amygdala may be critical for the acquisition of
extinction learning, the vmPFC is also necessary for the acquisi-
tion and recall of extinction. This was first demonstrated by Mor-
gan et al. (1993), who found that rodents with vmPFC lesions
requiredmanymore presentations of the CS to extinguish condi-
tioned fear. It was later found that the infralimbic (IL) region of the
vmPFC is the site of extinction consolidation (Quirk et al., 2000).
Disruption of protein synthesis (Santini et al., 2004), MAPk
blockade (Hugues et al., 2006), and administration of an NMDA
antagonist (Burgos-Robles et al., 2007) within the vmPFC im-
pairs retrieval of extinction, indicating that the plasticity in this re-
gion supports extinction consolidation. Electrophysiological
studies suggest that the IL inhibits the expression of conditioned
fear during extinction through reciprocal connections with the
amygdala. IL neurons show increased activity to the CS during
extinction retrieval (Milad and Quirk, 2002) and stimulation of IL
neurons both decreases the responsiveness of CE neurons
(Quirk et al., 2003) and diminishes conditioned responding to a
non-extinguished CS (Milad et al., 2004). Inhibition of fear
expression during extinction may therefore occur through IL
activation of the inhibitory ITC projections to the CE, or through
IL activation of inhibitory interneurons in the LA (see Milad and
Quirk, 2012 for review).
Following extinction, contextual information plays a critical
role in determining whether the original fear memory or the
new extinction memory controls fear expression (see Bouton,
2004). Rats with hippocampal lesions show impaired contextual
renewal of the CR (Wilson et al., 1995), and inactivation of the
hippocampus after extinction learning prevents the renewal of
conditioned fear (Hobin et al., 2006). In addition, inactivation of
the hippocampus before extinction learning impairs extinction
recall on the subsequent day (e.g., Corcoran et al., 2005). This
suggests that the hippocampus may mediate fear expression
both outside and within the extinction context. The hippocam-
pus is proposed to control the context-specific retrieval of
extinction both indirectly through projections to the vmPFC
and directly through projections to the LA (see Maren et al.,
2013 for a review).
Consistent with studies in animal models, functional neuroi-
maging, lesion, and morphology studies in humans indicate
that extinction learning depends on the integrated functioning
of a neural circuit that includes the amygdala, the vmPFC, and
the hippocampus (Milad and Quirk, 2012). This convergent evi-
dence suggests that the neural mechanisms supporting fear
extinction are phylogenetically conserved across species.
Psychological and Cognitive Factors
It is widely recognized that whatever is learned in extinction is
more fragile than the original associations trained through CS-
US conditioning, as evidenced by findings that the acquisition
CR returns in a variety of situations. This apparent inability to
abolish the memory of a conditioning experience may be adap-
tive: in nature, signals for danger may rarely coincide with actualNeuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 49
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defensive response could promote survival. From this perspec-
tive, the fragility and transience of extinction seems appropri-
ately balanced against the strength and persistence of condi-
tioning. In fear learning, the term ‘‘adaptive conservatism’’ or
‘‘anxiety conservation’’ have been used to describe this better-
safe-than-sorry approach (Solomon and Wynne, 1954); the sur-
vival cost of inappropriately disregarding a danger signal is
higher than the cost of inappropriately responding to those sig-
nals when threat is not imminent. Thus, despite repeated presen-
tations of a CS in the absence of the US, maintaining some trace
of the original memory could provide defense against even the
remote possibility of future threat.
A number of psychological factors may help support the main-
tenance of the conditioning memory after extinction (Lovibond,
2004). One factor is beliefs or contingency knowledge regarding
the CS-US relationship. For example, if during extinction another
stimulus is presented at the same time as the CS, or a novel ac-
tion is enabled that prevents the occurrence of the US, this other
stimulus or action can prevent the original CS from acquiring
inhibitory properties, an effect referred to as ‘‘protection from
extinction’’ (Rescorla, 2003). Indeed, once the other stimulus or
action is removed, the CR returns, suggesting that the absence
of the US had been attributed to the (now absent) additional fac-
tor. To clinicians, protection from extinction may be reflected in
safety behaviors that interfere with the success of exposure-
based therapy.
Cognitive mechanisms are also involved in complex forms of
inhibitory learning that involve retrospective revaluation (Dickin-
son and Burke, 1996). In backward blocking, for example, sub-
jects learn that a compound of two stimuli (e.g., a light and a
tone) predicts a US. Presented alone, each element will elicit
some amount of conditioned responding. However, if one
element of the compound (e.g., the light) is then paired alone
with the US, then the second element (the tone) ceases to elicit
a conditioned response. It seems that since the light can fully
predict the US, the tone is retrospectively regarded as unrelated
to the US. Such effects that arise from retrospective revaluation
provide strong evidence that the memory representation of a CS
and its predictive value can be updated even when the CS is ab-
sent. In part because such updating is challenging (though not
insurmountable) for classic associative learning mechanisms,
and in part because, in humans, many of these experiments
were framed in causal learning terms, these effects have been in-
terpreted in terms of cognitive beliefs and expectancies about
the causal nature of the CS (Lovibond, 2004). However, retro-
spective revaluation and protection from extinction effects occur
in other species (e.g., Miller and Matute, 1996; Rescorla, 2003),
and although these effects may implicate explicit causal
reasoning in humans, some modern theoretical accounts recon-
ceptualize standard associative learning in similar terms, as
effectively a mechanism for inferring the causal relationships un-
derlying observed events (Courville et al., 2003, 2005; Gershman
and Niv, 2012)—as described in detail below. Viewed from this
perspective, extinction can generate a number of beliefs about
the CS-US relationship: for instance, the CS no longer predicts
the US, the CS predicts the US less reliably than before, or the
CS predicts the US just as reliably as it did before, but something50 Neuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.else is temporarily preventing the US from occurring. Belief in
each proposition could result in the same reduction of fear at
the time of extinction, but which belief predominates can deter-
mine whether expression favors the extinction memory or the
fear memory in the future.
Associative Learning Theories of Extinction
A number of influential learning theories explain acquisition and
extinction of Pavlovian conditioning (see Figure 1). The following
section is not an exhaustive review of these theories but instead
describes how extinction is generally conceptualized within an
associative learning framework. As discussed above, theoretical
views of extinction fall broadly within two general classes: asso-
ciative loss or ‘‘unlearning’’ (e.g., Rescorla and Wagner, 1972),
and new inhibitory learning or interference (e.g., Pearce and
Hall, 1980). But these two mechanisms are not mutually exclu-
sive, a point that has come into clearer focus in a newer series
of statistical learning models, which have reconceptualized
the key mechanisms of classic associative learning models as
each arising from different aspects of sound statistical inference.
Applied to extinction, this class of models points toward a single
account balancing contributions from both unlearning and inter-
ference, and which may help to clarify the experimental circum-
stances thatmay favor either mechanism (Gershman et al., 2010;
Redish et al., 2007). Furthermore, whereas associative learning
theories have historically been more successful at explaining
initial extinction rather than post-extinction recovery effects
(e.g., Miller et al., 1995), newer theories aim more explicitly at a
unified account of both.
Rescorla-Wagner and the Kalman Filter
The most influential associative learning account of Pavlovian
conditioning is the Rescorla and Wagner model (Rescorla and
Wagner, 1972). The model suggests that discrepancies between
the predicted and actual outcome drives learning (‘‘error correct-
ing learning’’). Associative strength (Figure 1A, top) increases
when a surprising US (positive prediction error) occurs and
decreases due to the absence of a predicted US (negative
prediction error). This model has been used with great success
to describe a number of conditioning-related phenomena,
including simple acquisition curves and more complex forms of
learning involving cue competition such as blocking (Kamin,
1969) and over-expectation (Rescorla, 1970). However, one of
the more notable failures of the model is in describing post-
extinction recovery effects (Miller et al., 1995). This is because,
in this model, extinction engenders a simple decrease of the
associative value of the CS. Thus, extinction is viewed as a
form of unlearning and, consequently, recovery is not predicted.
This failure in explaining extinction notwithstanding, the core
error-driven learning (and unlearning) mechanism of Rescorla-
Wagner has received support from two directions. First, a neural
substrate for prediction error signals has been identified in the
phasic firing of dopamine neurons in the midbrain (Barto, 1995;
Montague et al., 1996; Schultz et al., 1997). These neurons’ ac-
tivities correlate with prediction errors postulated by Rescorla-
Wagner, and evidence from various manipulations of their activ-
ity suggests their causal involvement in conditioning. However,
this particular system has been examined predominantly in
appetitive rather than aversive conditioning; evidence about
Figure 1. Simplified Illustration of Theoretical Models of Extinction
Different theoreticalmodels of associative learning imply different processes in
extinction.
(A) In the Rescorla-Wagner model (top), associative weights (w) between CSs
and USs can increase and decrease based on prediction errors. Here acqui-
sition involves a neutral weight (w = 0) acquiring value (e.g., w = 1) over time.
Extinction in this model causes ‘‘unlearning’’ as the negative prediction errors
due to the omission of the expectedUSdecreasewback to zero. In contrast, in
the Pearce-Hall or Bouton models (middle), extinction training causes learning
of a new association, here denoted by a new weight w2 that predicts the
absence of the US. Thus, extinction does not erase the value that w1 acquired
during the original training. The latent cause model (bottom) formalizes and
extends this latter idea—here multiple associations (denoted by the arbitrary
number N) can exist between a CS and a US, and inference about which latent
cause is currently active affects how learning from the prediction error is
distributed among these associations. In particular, the theory specifies the
statistical conditions under which a new association (weight) is formed, and
how learning on each trial is distributed among all existing weights.
(B) Another way to view the latent cause framework is as imposing a clustering
of trials, before applying learning. Similar trials are clustered together (i.e.,
attributed to the same latent cause), and learning of weights occurs within a
latent cause (that is, each latent cause has its own weight). Note that while the
illustration suggests that each trial (tone and shock, or tone alone) resides in
one cluster only, this is an oversimplification. In practice, the model assigns
trials to latent causes probabilistically (e.g., 90% to cause 1 and 10% to
cause 2). Since on every trial there is some probability that a new latent cause
has become active, the total number of clusters is equal to the number of trials
so far; however, many clusters are effectively empty.
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and Hikosaka, 2009; Ungless et al., 2004) and there may well be
additional neural systems playing a similar role in the aversive
domain (Daw et al., 2002).
Rescorla-Wagner’s error-driven learning principle also arises
independently from statistically principled accounts of condi-
tioning. In particular, alongside the rise of Bayesian accounts in
psychology more generally, recent theoretical work has aimed
to reconceptualize classic associative learning accounts of con-
ditioning (which are more mechanistic) in terms of normative ac-
counts of statistical reasoning about events given noisy evidence
(Dayan and Long, 1998). One of the early successes of this pro-
gram of research was the observation that, given a particular set
of assumptions about the structure of noise in the world, stan-
dard statistical reasoning about the relationship between CSs
and USs gives rise to a rule (known independently in engineering
as the Kalman filter) that corresponds closely to the Rescorla-
Wagner model (Kakade and Dayan, 2002). In particular, this
rule includes the key error-driven learningmechanism but gener-
alizes the model to include CS-processing mechanisms similar
to the Pearce-Hall model (described below) (Courville et al.,
2006; Dayan et al., 2000) and to account for retrospective reval-
uation (Daw et al., 2008; Dayan and Kakade, 2001). These
accounts, however, do not alone shed light on the Rescorla-
Wagner model’s original failure to account for recovery and
renewal following extinction.
Pearce-Hall
A second key account of conditioning is that of Pearce and Hall
(1980). Though Rescorla-Wagner and Pearce-Hall models are
most famous for differing with respect to their accounts of cue
competition phenomena (discussed below), another major de-
parture between these two models are their accounts of extinc-
tion. Pearce and Hall (1980) recognized that ‘‘the problem we
face in supplying an adequate account of inhibitory learning is
rather more fundamental than that met when we first considered
excitatory learning. In that case there was, at least, fairly general
agreement about the way in which the relationship between CS
and US is represented internally. There is no such agreement in
the case of inhibitory learning’’ (p. 543). According to the Pearce-
Hall theory, extinction involves new inhibitory learning. Thus, a
CS-no US association develops due to omission of the expected
US and can be expressed behaviorally and psychologically
through stimulus omission responses, such as frustration due
to withdrawal of reward (Amsel, 1958), relief due to omission of
an expected threat (Gerber et al., 2014), or orienting in response
to a missing stimulus (Dunsmoor and LaBar, 2012). Pearce and
Hall (1980) viewed these unconditional no-US responses as
evidence that absence of the US is in itself an outcome pro-
cessed with the currently activated CS representation, thereby
generating the CS-no US association (Figure 1A, middle). In
this way, Pearce and Hall make no distinction between excit-
atory and inhibitory learning: ‘‘We regard extinction as a new
form of conditioning’’ (p. 546).
The Pearce-Hall model thus assumes that expression of the
excitatory CR diminishes due to an inhibitory relationship be-
tween the CS-US association and the CS-no US association.
This idea that conditioning can invoke parallel, positive and nega-
tive associations simultaneously goes back at least to KonorskiNeuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 51
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distinct pathways out of the striatum (known as the direct and in-
direct pathways), which have opposing effects on behavior.
Although this idea has been examined mostly in instrumental
conditioning, these two pathways appear to serve as parallel tar-
gets for positive and negative plasticity (see Frank et al., 2004).
The other core component of the Pearce-Hall model that dis-
tinguishes it from the Rescorla-Wagner model is an emphasis on
dynamic changes in a CS’s susceptibility to Pavlovian condition-
ing, referred to as the CS’s ‘‘associability.’’ According to their
model, the associability of a CS increases when surprise (abso-
lute prediction error) is high and diminishes when surprise is low.
Since aCS’s associability governs the extent of learning about its
associations, these dynamics give rise to a number of effects
involving stronger or weaker learning following different experi-
ences. In particular, during acquisition, the surprising US in-
creases CS associability, promoting CS-US learning. This
samemechanism is thought to be invoked, symmetrically, during
extinction, as the surprising omission of the US increases CS as-
sociability once again, promoting CS-no US learning. Notably,
the more reliably a CS predicts the US at the end of acquisition
(and therefore the lower its associability), then the slower extinc-
tion will be on the first few trials, as associability is restored.
Increasing surprise just prior to extinction sessions should in-
crease the rate of extinction, a prediction confirmed in an exper-
iment reported in Pearce and Hall (1980).
Although the associability gating mechanism of Pearce-Hall
and the prediction-error learning of Rescorla-Wagner were
initially seen as two competing explanations for conditioning
phenomena, they are, in fact, complementary and may both
coexist in the brain (Le Pelley, 2004). Evidence for neural associ-
ability signals has been reported in rodent and human amygdala,
alongside prediction errors observed in the midbrain dopamine
system and striatum (Li et al., 2011; Roesch et al., 2010).
Associability-like effects also arise naturally, gating the
strength of error-driven learning, in the Kalman filter and related
statistical models (Behrens et al., 2007; Courville et al., 2006;
Dayan et al., 2000). In particular, a hallmark of statistical learning,
which follows directly from Bayes’ theorem, is that the extent to
which a learner should be willing to update their beliefs about
a CS’s associations in the face of each new prediction error
depends upon the extent to which they were uncertain (or,
conversely, confident) about those beliefs beforehand. The
centerpiece of Bayesian learning models is the dynamic ac-
counting of this uncertainty, which serves as their formal coun-
terpart to the older construct of associability and helps to clarify
its interpretation. The correspondence is good; uncertainty in
these models behaves both qualitatively and quantitatively simi-
larly to associability. Finally, as discussed below, uncertainty’s
role in gating learning extends beyond simply controlling how
fast extinction occurs; it should also affect the balance between
different types of learning that might arise during extinction,
notably between unlearning and interference.
Extinction as a Form of Memory Interference
The predominant theoretical basis of post-extinction recovery
effects is that proposed by Bouton (1993, 2004). Similar to the
Pearce-Hall explanation, Bouton views extinction as a context-52 Neuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.dependent form of new inhibitory learning, and retrieval of the
inhibitory memory interferes with expression of the excitatory
memory. However, because in this view extinction is a
context-dependent memory, retrieval rarely survives a shift in
context: extinction is tied to where it was learned. A key element
in Bouton’s theory of extinction is that new inhibitory learning
renders the CS ambiguous because its presence now signals
either the presence or the absence of the US. Resolving this am-
biguity after extinction relies on the current context, much as the
context of a sentence determines the meaning of an ambiguous
word. If the context at test is similar to the context in which
extinction occurred, retrieval tends to favor the inhibitory CS-
no US memory. Otherwise, retrieval tends to favor the CS-US
memory, since this association was learned first or is simply
more prominent. Bouton proposes that time is also a context
and therefore spontaneous recovery can be seen as renewal.
Reinstatement is similarly context dependent, as it occurs only
if unpaired presentations of the US occur in the same context
as subsequent presentations of the CS (see Bouton, 2004).
Latent Cause Models
A further refinement of the statistical learning models of condi-
tioning suggests a more formal underpinning for Bouton’s ideas
about context and extinction (Courville et al., 2005; Gershman
et al., 2010; Gershman and Niv, 2012). The key idea here is
that conditioning is conceived as inference about the causal
structure that gives rise to observed stimuli such as CSs and
USs. However, unlike the Kalman filter (and the associative
learning theories that are its cousins) it is not assumed that the
CS is directly (e.g., causally) linked to the US. Instead, some
third, not observable event causes them both. Such an event is
known as a latent cause. This class of models use statistical
inference to figure out how likely it is that different underlying
structures of latent causes produced the experienced patterns
of observable stimuli, including CSs and USs but also other stim-
uli that comprise the context. Then, on any particular trial, the CR
is determined by using this structure to predict which cause is
likely to be active at this point in time and thus whether a US is
expected (Courville et al., 2005; Courville et al., 2003; Gershman
et al., 2010; Gershman and Niv, 2012).
Informally, this process of inferring the latent cause respon-
sible for each trial is similar to clustering trials into different cat-
egories based on patterns of CSs and USs. CS-US associations
following acquisition training are clustered together (Figure 1B)
and are represented via a single latent cause that is likely to pro-
duce the CS, the US, and any other available internal and
external contextual stimuli. When a US is omitted, the mismatch
between this event and the pattern predicted by the previous
learning causes the model to infer that this trial is likely to have
been produced by a new and previously unobserved latent
cause, which predicts the CS but not the US, that is, to assign
the trial to a new cluster (Figure 1B). Subsequent renewal or re-
covery, and their context sensitivity, depend on the organism
judging which of these two latent causes, old or new, is likely
active at the current time, based on how well either one can ac-
count for the full panoply of cues currently available. These cues
include spatial and temporal context, which gives rise to the
sensitivity of recovery phenomena to contextual manipulations.
Neuron
PerspectiveIn this way, the clusters or latent causes formalize Bouton’s
notion of context, and the model captures much of the context
sensitivity of extinction learning (Gershman et al., 2010).
Importantly, latent cause models subsume both mechanisms
of extinction discussed above: the notion of new interfering
learning (the creation of a new latent cause), together with the
possibility that the extinction experience will attenuate or update
the original fear association (which happens to the extent that
the extinction trial is assigned to the old latent cause), as sug-
gested by Rescorla and Wagner. In particular, during extinction,
the model continues to learn about the associations of each
possible latent cause, with learning distributed between them
depending on inference of how likely each cause is to be active
(Figure 1A, bottom). To the extent to which an extinction trial is
judged to be attributed to the original latent cause rather than
a new one, the original CS-US association will be updated,
thus reducing the prediction of the US associated with the orig-
inal latent cause. Such updating follows similar statistical princi-
ples to the Kalman filter and other Bayesian parameter-learning
models discussed so far; in particular, larger prediction errors
and more uncertainty about the weights of the latent cause
(standing in for associability) increase the rate of updating,
combining the key features of the classic associative learning
models of Rescorla-Wagner and Pearce-Hall. Conversely, to
the extent to which an extinction trial is judged to be attributed
to a new latent cause, that new cause will come to be associated
with the CS but with the absence of the US.
The latent causemodel therefore predicts that different training
patterns may give rise to different balances of updating the orig-
inal fear memory or the formation of a new extinction memory.
For instance, new latent causes should be most often and most
confidently created for themost surprising events (those produc-
ing larger prediction errors), since these are the ones that the
existing latent cause can least adequately explain. Conversely,
this suggests that accomplishing extinction by a series of smaller
prediction errors rather than a large one will promote erasure of
the original memory over interference (see below).
Moreover, the judgment of whether a new experiencematches
a previously trained latent cause versus requiring a new one will
also depend on how uncertain, or certain, are the old cause’s as-
sociations, since this, in part, determines how surprising an
anomalous experience should be. This model thus predicts
that uncertainty (formalizing associability), and the various fac-
tors that affects it, such as surprise, overtraining, and environ-
mental volatility, will not only modulate the modification of an ex-
isting cause’s associations, but will also affect the likelihood of
creating a new cause.
A possible biological foundation for some of these mecha-
nismswas also suggested in an earlier model of extinction byRe-
dish et al. (2007), which envisions that something similar to latent
causes is implemented by attractor states in the cortex. The sta-
bility of the attractor landscape (and hence the tendency, effec-
tively, to interpret events as arising from an existing cause versus
splitting out a new one) is hypothesized to depend on tonic levels
of dopamine, giving rise to an influence of dopaminergically
signaled prediction errors on the likelihood of creating causes.
Altogether, then, the latent cause framework comprises both
of the major mechanisms of extinction from associative learningmodels, together with further machinery (generalizing earlier
ideas about prediction errors and associability) for balancing
their effects. This framework provides a promising basis, which
has not yet been fully explored, for developing new, more effec-
tive extinction procedures and for understanding why some ap-
proaches have previously shown to be more successful than
others in preventing fear recovery. In the next section, we review
many of these approaches, highlighting their possible connec-
tions (especially those yet to be fully understood) with the hy-
pothesized computational elements.
Augmenting Extinction
As discussed above, one of the most reliable findings from fear
extinction research is that defensive behaviors are recovered
over time, reinstated via presentation of the US, renewed
following a change in context, and quickly reacquired: collec-
tively referred to as the return of fear. Consequently, if the goal
of extinction is to permanently reduce unwanted behavior, as
in the case of exposure therapy, traditional extinction protocols
seem a rather unsatisfactory approach. Establishing safe and
effective techniques to strengthen extinction is a fundamental
goal of translational research that adopts conditioning-based
approaches toward psychotherapy.
What Is the Matter with Extinction?
Return of fear phenomenaareelegantly explainedby the view that
extinction is a context-dependent form of inhibitory learning and
that relapse is due to a failure to retrieve inhibitory CS-no US as-
sociations (Bouton, 1993). Asmentioned earlier, failure to retrieve
the extinction (or ‘‘safety’’) memory can be adaptive from the
perspective that mistakenly treating safe stimuli as dangerous is
often far lesscostly than thealternative.Viewed from thisperspec-
tive, clinical treatments based on extinction principles face an up-
hill struggle, becausemechanismsare inplaceat thebasic level of
learning and memory to ‘‘forget’’ safety much more readily than
threat (Bouton, 1993; Solomon and Wynne, 1954).
Traditional CS-alone extinction procedures have a number of
shortcomings that challenge their usefulness as the basis for
exposure therapy. First, extinction relies on negative prediction
errors, reliably generated only if the CS predicted the US consis-
tently enough to render its absence a violation of expectancy in
the first place. In most real-world situations, however, highly
feared outcomes may occur infrequently (or not at all). For
example, an individual fearful of heights may maintain the fear
despite never falling. Indeed, extinction proceeds more slowly
following partial reinforcement, a result known as the partial rein-
forcement extinction effect (Jenkins and Stanley, 1950). Statisti-
cal learning models also capture this effect by accounting for the
uncertainty and variability of events; if a US occurs rarely, its
omission is unsurprising and should not engender much learning
(Courville et al., 2006; Kakade and Dayan, 2002).
Another shortcoming of extinction procedures is that there is
often little correlation between behavioral measures and mem-
ory strength. For instance, fear conditioning in rodents shows
that within-session decreases in the CR are not predictive of be-
tween-session recovery of the CR (Plendl andWotjak, 2010), and
in fact ‘‘higher’’ fear responses during extinction are in some
cases associated with stronger and more persistent extinction
learning (e.g., Rescorla, 2006). Relatedly, Craske et al. (2008)Neuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 53
Figure 2. Augmenting Extinction
Behavioral and pharmacological techniques to augment standard extinction, the time point at which each technique could be applied, and the putative
mechanism by which each technique operates to prevent the return of unwanted behaviors.
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ing exposure treatment does not predict therapeutic outcomes.
Latent cause models of extinction, in fact, predict this inverse
relationship between the rate of extinction and magnitude of re-
covery. That is, if during extinction a new latent cause is inferred,
the CR will decrease rapidly, but the original memory (old latent
cause) will not be updated. If, however, a new latent cause is not
inferred, fear responsesmay persist while predictions contingent
on the original latent cause are gradually updated. The latter ef-
fect should in principle lead to gradual erasure of the fear mem-
ory (Gershman and Hartley, 2015).
Finally, extinction procedures render the CS ambiguous (Bou-
ton, 2004), which, in the clinic, may create an unfavorable situa-
tion for individuals averse to ambiguity and uncertainty. For
instance, Dunsmoor et al. (2015a) found that individuals with
high self-reported intolerance of uncertainty expressed greater
spontaneous recovery after fear extinction.
Given these demonstrated difficulties with the persistence of
extinction learning, techniques to augment extinction are needed.
Below, we discuss the idea of modifying traditional extinction
protocols to reduce the return of unwanted behavior and review
emerging approaches that have shownsuccess in animal, human,
preclinical, and clinical applications. As an organizing principle,
each approach is described in terms of whether it is thought to
target the CS-US association (the ‘‘fear’’ memory), strengthen
inhibitory learning (the extinction or ‘‘safety’’ memory), or promote
retrieval of the inhibitory memory (see Figure 2) (see also Craske
et al., 2014; Fitzgerald et al., 2014; Laborda et al., 2011).
Targeting the Fear Memory
Consolidation
The most effective procedure to abolish the conditioned
response permanently would be to eliminate the memory of
the CS-US association altogether. One approach is to block
consolidation of the fear memory by blocking protein synthesis
in the amygdala around the time of fear conditioning. If protein54 Neuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.synthesis inhibitors are applied to the LA soon after conditioning,
then the immediate expression of fear (short-termmemory) is left
intact, but expression at a later time (long-term memory) is
impaired (for review of consolidation processes related to fear
conditioning, see Johansen et al., 2011).
Blocking protein synthesis directly in the amygdala is possible
in animal models but is not practical or safe for human therapeu-
tics. One feasible alternative is to administer pharmacological
agents that reduce noradrenergic system activity soon after an
aversive experience, which is thought to influence protein syn-
thesis in the amygdala (Gelinas and Nguyen, 2005), in order to
impede consolidation of emotional memory. A limited number
of clinical studies have found that administration of the b-adren-
ergic antagonist propranolol shortly after trauma may reduce
PTSD symptoms (Pitman et al., 2002; Vaiva et al., 2003), but re-
sults of more recent studies have shown less promise (Sharp
et al., 2010). Importantly, null findings may be due to propranolol
administration several days following trauma, which is likely
beyond the time window of consolidation.
Another potential method to target consolidation of the CS-US
memory is to administer extinction training immediately after fear
conditioning in order to interfere with ongoing consolidation pro-
cesses. In clinical practice, early intervention by exposure ther-
apy following trauma may reduce PTSD symptoms (Rothbaum
et al., 2014). Notably, some immediate interventions for trauma
that are not based on extinction principles, like psychological de-
briefing, may in fact exacerbate anxiety symptoms (Bisson et al.,
1997) and have received considerable criticism as a treatment
option for PTSD (e.g., Litz et al., 2002). Laboratory studies of im-
mediate versus delayed extinction are mixed—whereas some
labs have found that immediate extinction eliminated sponta-
neous recovery in rats (Myers et al., 2006), others have found
that immediate extinction is less effective than delayed extinc-
tion in preventing the return of fear in rats and humans (Huff
et al., 2009; Maren and Chang, 2006; Schiller et al., 2008) (see
Maren, 2014 for review).
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Of course, most individuals who seek treatment for fear and
anxiety disorders do so long after negative memories have
consolidated. Moreover, in many psychiatric illnesses, with the
notable exception of PTSD, the etiology is unclear, and so iden-
tifying what constitutes early intervention is challenging. How-
ever, later treatment may also target the original memory by
taking advantage of the phenomenon of reconsolidation, in
which re-exposure or reactivation of a previously created long-
termmemory brings it to a labile state. Studies of reconsolidation
suggest that previously consolidated long-term memories can
be modified, weakened, or even erased via interventions timed
after reactivation of the memory trace and before it is reconsoli-
dated. In a landmark study by Nader and colleagues (2000),
conditioned fear responses in rats were effectively abolished
by administration of protein synthesis inhibitors into the LA
following reactivation of a previously consolidated fear memory.
This finding has generated excitement for the idea of targeting
and disrupting specific fear memories.
As with blocking consolidation of the original fear memory,
administering protein synthesis inhibitors directly into the
amygdala in humans is an unrealistic solution to the problem of
persistent and intrusive trauma memories. One possibility is to
administer safer pharmacological agents, like propranolol, to
disrupt memory reconsolidation. Thus far, this protocol has
yielded mixed results in PTSD patients (Brunet et al., 2008;
Wood et al., 2015). However, primary outcome measures for
this research tend to rely on physiological responses during
script-driven traumatic imagery, which may be susceptible to
individual variability not assessed prior to trauma (Wood et al.,
2015). Soeter and Kindt (2015) administered propranolol to
participants with arachnophobia following a 2 min exposure to
spiders and found reduced fear behaviors toward spiders 1
year after treatment. However, results of laboratory studies of
propranolol administration following emotional memory reacti-
vation in humans have also been mixed, with some fear-condi-
tioning studies showing reductions in fear-potentiated startle
but not conditioned skin conductance responses (Kindt et al.,
2009), and other studies finding no effect on either physiological
measure (Bos et al., 2014).
A non-pharmacological approach developed by Monfils and
colleagues (2009) takes advantage of the reconsolidation period
by incorporating traditional extinction trials 10 min after reacti-
vation of the consolidated fear memory. This technique was
effective at preventing spontaneous recovery, renewal, rein-
statement, and rapid reacquisition in rats (Monfils et al., 2009).
The technique has also been effective at reducing the return of
fear in humans, even 1 year after the original training and extinc-
tion (Schiller et al., 2010) and has also been applied to the
domain of drug-seeking behaviors in rats and humans (Xue
et al., 2012), suggesting that it generalizes across both appetitive
and aversive persistent associations. Neurobiologically, extinc-
tion following reactivation has been shown to both induce plas-
ticity-related changes in the LA in rodents (Clem and Huganir,
2010; Monfils et al., 2009) and reduce involvement of vmPFC
inhibitory networks during extinction in humans (Schiller et al.,
2013), consistent with the notion that this behavioral intervention
is targeting the original fear memory.This extinction following reactivation approach has received
considerable attention, largely due to its straightforward poten-
tial as a therapeutic strategy. A major advantage is that the tech-
nique does not depend on pharmacological agents. However,
some laboratories have failed to show an effect of extinction
following reactivation in rodents (Chan et al., 2010) and humans
(Golkar et al., 2012). From a theoretical standpoint, an important
question that remains unclear is why extinction trials following
an earlier (CS-alone) memory-reactivation trial overwrite prior
learning, while extinction trials without an earlier reactivation trial
initiate new learning. That is, it is not clear why the first trial of
standard extinction does not act as a reactivation trial, leading
to subsequent updating of the fear memory by extinction trials
that fall within the reconsolidation time window (Delamater and
Westbrook, 2014).
More broadly, across both pharmacological and behavioral
techniques aimed at targeting reconsolidation, the precise con-
ditions that initiate reconsolidation of the original memory trace
following reactivation remain unclear (Suzuki et al., 2004). This
brings these procedures back into contact with theoretical
models of learning. That is, although consolidation and reconso-
lidation have mostly been discussed in terms of the biological
processes of plasticity, this focus is not inconsistent with simul-
taneously conceptualizing them in the computational terms of
statistical or associative learning models, whose principles are
implemented by the biological processes. Specifically, reconso-
lidation (and the concomitant susceptibility tomemory alteration)
may arise under circumstances when experiences would lead to
a memory being retrieved and modified, as opposed to a new
memory being created. If so, this suggests that the same sorts
of statistical factors that modulate the dominance of old versus
new latent causes in Gershman et al. (2010)’s model will also
affect the susceptibility to reconsolidation.
Consistent with this idea that susceptibility to reconsolidation
varies based on the learning context, recent research suggests
several boundary conditions that limit the effectiveness of target-
ing reconsolidation, many of which bear similarity to situations
highlighted in latent cause models as leading to the formation
of a new memory (i.e., inferring a new latent cause), as opposed
to memory modification (i.e., inferring the old latent cause).
These include strength and generalization of initial learning and
age of the memory (Clem and Huganir, 2010; Suzuki et al.,
2004; Taubenfeld et al., 2009). Even more directly paralleling
memory modification in latent cause models, one factor that
may initiate memory destabilization and reconsolidation is the
detection of prediction errors due to mismatch in the expecta-
tions of CS-US association between initial acquisition and mem-
ory reactivation (Dı´az-Mataix et al., 2013).
Gradual Extinction
Another behavioral method for modification of the original fear
memory builds more directly on the latent cause framework. Ac-
cording to this framework, the large difference in observed stim-
uli at extinction (CS only) compared to acquisition (CS and US)
provides evidence for the existence of a new latent cause at
the beginning of extinction. Once a new latent cause is inferred,
further extinction trials are attributed in large part to that new
latent cause, and thus extinction learning is no longer applied
to the original latent cause. In essence, the new latent causeNeuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 55
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model thus predicts that making extinctionmore similar to acqui-
sition should help prevent inference of a new latent cause and
direct all learning in the extinction phase to the old cause,
resulting in updating of the original fear memory. Gershman
and colleagues tested this prediction using a ‘‘gradual extinc-
tion’’ technique in which some extinction trials were reinforced
with a US. The frequency of reinforced trials diminished
throughout the extinction session, essentially ‘‘weaning’’ the
rats off the shock US. This technique was effective in preventing
spontaneous recovery and reinstatement in rats (Gershman
et al., 2013). Notably, rats who received five shocks during
gradual extinction exhibited less recovery and reinstatement
than rats who received no shocks during traditional extinction.
These results are consistent with demonstrations that rapid
extinction is actually accompanied by more spontaneous
recovery (Gershman and Hartley, 2015) and suggest that clinical
practices that aim to speed up extinctionmight actually be coun-
terproductive (Craske et al., 2008).
General Issues in Targeting the Fear Memory
A practical concern for therapeutic use of approaches that target
the CS-US memory directly is that fearful experiences are prone
to generalization beyond the details of the CS (Dunsmoor and
Paz, 2015). However, in rats, higher-order (indirectly associated)
fear memories do not become labile via reactivation of the first-
order (direct CS-US association) fear memory (Debiec et al.,
2006); thus, it is not clear how to target the whole network of
related memories. Of course, it makes sense that reconsolida-
tion would be specific to the actual reactivated memory—pre-
sumably, the role of reconsolidation is to update this memory
with new relevant knowledge, not to erroneously alter or update
all other memories within that network. For treatment purposes,
however, the ability to update fear memories at a generalized
level is desired, since fear memories consist of multiple elements
that become interweaved within a broad associative network
(Dunsmoor and Murphy, 2015). For example, in PTSD, panic,
phobias, and other anxiety disorders, a multitude of objects, pla-
ces, sensations, or abstract concepts can act as triggers to
induce anxiety symptoms (e.g., Bouton et al., 2001). Recent
research suggests that one approach to target a broader asso-
ciative fear network is to use the US, as opposed to CS, as a
reactivation cue (Liu et al., 2014).
Importantly, the goal of most anxiety treatments is not to elimi-
nate memories altogether but to make negative memories less
persistent and intrusive and to decouple episodic content from
emotional responses. According to the influential ‘‘emotional pro-
cessing theory’’ (Foa and Kozak, 1986), fear representations are
cognitive in nature and are maintained within informational struc-
tures (fear structures or schemas). Activating fear structures
during therapy allows corrective information to weaken the asso-
ciation between informational elements and fear responses.
Although treatment approaches differ among clinicians (e.g.,
Craskeetal., 2008), thismodel of fearmemory remainsadominant
view that continues to guide anxiety research and psychiatric
treatment. Importantly, the intent of effective exposure therapy is
to target only the pathological elements of a memory structure.
Finally, it is important to consider whether positive findings
of techniques that putatively target the CS-US association are56 Neuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.due to memory modification or erasure, or, alternatively, are
due to strengthened inhibitory learning (Lattal and Wood,
2013). At this stage, there is not a definitive neurobiological
marker of persistent memory alteration, and the absence of the
CR at tests of return of fear is necessary but not sufficient evi-
dence of erasure.
Strengthening Extinction
Compound or ‘‘Deepened’’ Extinction
As nearly all associative models describe extinction as new
inhibitory learning rather than unlearning, many efforts to prevent
the return of fear focus on ways to promote better extinction
learning so that the association learned in extinction later out-
competes the original fear memory for expression. One recently
developed strategy is to conduct extinction in the presence of
another fear-conditioned stimulus (i.e., a second exciter). In
this technique, two or more CSs (e.g., CSA and CSB, a light
and a tone) are paired separately with the US. Next, one CS is
presented during extinction (or both CSs are extinguished sepa-
rately in an alternate version of this task; Leung et al., 2012). The
two CSs are then combined (e.g., a light/tone compound), and
extinction continues with the compound. Rescorla (2000) was
the first to demonstrate that extinction is enhanced by the
presence of an additional excitatory CS, a technique referred
to as ‘‘deepened extinction’’ (Rescorla, 2006). In a number of
subsequent animal studies, deepened extinction was shown to
reduce spontaneous recovery, reinstatement, reacquisition,
and renewal (e.g., Leung et al., 2012), and reduced spontaneous
recovery of conditioned SCRs was shown in a recent human fear
conditioning study (Culver et al., 2015).
In theoretical terms, the key principle of deepened extinction
seems to be summation, i.e., the idea that when twoCSs are pre-
sented together, the netUSexpectancy, and therefore thepoten-
tial prediction error, reflects the sum over both CSs’ separate
associations (Rescorla and Wagner, 1972). Here, when CS A
and CS B are trained and CS A is extinguished, presenting the
two CSs together increases the (joint) prediction of the US. The
prediction error generated by the continued omission of the US
in the face of this heightened US expectancy can therefore
decrease the associative value of CS A below the level that
it could attain had it continued to be extinguished alone.
Rescorla-Wagner’s summation principle even allows stimuli to
acquire negative associative strength, i.e., to cancel US predic-
tions that would otherwise be expected. This effect—known as
conditioned inhibition—traditionally arises when an otherwise
US-predicting stimulus is paired with a neutral stimulus and no
US is presented. The neutral stimulus then acquires inhibitory
(negative) associative strength, which can serve to ‘‘cancel’’ the
positive predictions of other concurrently presented stimuli.
Negative prediction errors during AB pairings, after A is already
extinguished, may thus make CS A a conditioned inhibitor,
contributing to thedeepenedextinctioneffect (Leunget al., 2012).
However, summation effects are not ubiquitous in condition-
ing, occurring in some circumstances but not others. Statistical
models of conditioning can explain boundary conditions and
apparently arbitrary effects of experimental protocols on predic-
tion learning. For instance, Soto and colleagues (2014) general-
izedGershman et al. (2010)’smodel to allowing formultiple latent
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CS B), capturing summation and related effects such as condi-
tioned inhibition. This model could effectively explain the results
of a wide variety of summation and generalization experiments,
within one statistical learning framework (Courville et al., 2003,
2005). Latent cause theories may therefore be helpful in under-
standing what circumstances promote or oppose the deep-
ened-extinction effect. Another avenue for future work is to
clarify how the events in a deepened extinction protocol affect
the trade-off between modification and interference, which
would also affect the efficacy of deepened extinction.
Massive Extinction Training
Pavlov observed that continuing extinction beyond the point that
the animal has stopped responding reduces spontaneous recov-
ery (i.e., ‘‘silent extinction beyond the zero’’; Pavlov 1927). More
recently, Denniston et al. (2003) showed that a substantial
number of extinction trials (800) diminished contextual renewal
in rats, providing evidence that extinction learning can be ex-
pressed outside the extinction context if training is immense. Ac-
cording to interference models of extinction, however, the depth
of extinction training should haveminimal effect on expression of
the CS-US association outside the extinction context; that is,
even if inhibitory learning is extraordinarily strong, the context
is still expected to gate expression of the extinction memory
(Bouton et al., 2006; Maren et al., 2013). In contrast, in latent
cause models, it is possible that massive extinction increases
the generality of the interfering memory (e.g., via increasing its
prior probability and its generality over different temporal
contexts). The concept of massive extinction relates clinically
to prolonged exposure therapy, an effective treatment for
PTSD (Powers et al., 2010).
Exposure to Novelty
A cornerstone of most associative learning models is that
learning is induced by the presence of novel or surprising events
(Pearce and Hall, 1980; Rescorla and Wagner, 1972). A number
of neural systems crucial for attention, learning, and memory
respond to novel events, and memory systems seem to favor
consolidation of novel information (Lisman et al., 2011). Novel
neutral stimuli also promote dopaminergic responses, and sur-
prising events activate a number of other neuromodulators
including norepinephrine and acetylcholine, which may also be
involved in gating learning (e.g., Yu and Dayan, 2005). As novelty
appears to promote learning processes, one approach to
strengthening extinction is by increasing novelty during or
around the time of learning.
Recently, Dunsmoor et al. (2014) used novel events to
augment extinction by replacing, rather than simply omitting,
an aversive electrical shock US with a surprising non-aversive
outcome (a tone). Compared to groups that received traditional
extinction training through shock omission alone, this modified
extinction paradigm, referred to as ‘‘novelty-facilitated extinc-
tion,’’ reduced spontaneous recovery of conditioned skin
conductance responses in humans and freezing in rats at a
24 hr test of extinction retention. One possibility for the effective-
ness of this procedure is that shock omission reduced the CR
while, simultaneously, the novel tone maintained attention to
the CS, increasing its associability and therefore the rate at
which the associative strength of the CS was updated in extinc-tion. This effect is captured in statistical models, including latent
cause models, by the idea that new learning should be gated by
uncertainty about previously inferred causal structures (Courville
et al., 2006; Dayan et al., 2000). Indeed, the core of statistical
inference models is formally tracking and manipulating uncer-
tainty, thus these models may help to design protocols that
maximally leverage uncertainty in the service of extinction. This
is especially important in light of the fact that novelty during
extinction may enhance learning of a competing association
(a new latent cause), at the expense of modification of the orig-
inal fear memory—a trade-off that should be carefully titrated.
Another, related line of research uses novelty exposure either
before or after fear extinction to enhance memory consolidation
(reviewed in Moncada et al., 2015). In one design (de Carvalho
Myskiw et al., 2013), animals are initially fear conditioned to a
context (cage), a hippocampal-dependent form of learning
(Maren et al., 2013). Rats are then ‘‘weakly’’ extinguished 24 hr
later by leaving them in the cage for 10 min without any shocks.
Weak training leads to short-term reductions in freezing but does
not lead to a long-term extinction memory as demonstrated by
near-complete recovery of freezing the next day. However, rats
who explore a novel open field 1 or 2 hr before or 1 hr after
weak extinction training showed significantly less freezing at a
long-term memory test than rats without novelty exploration.
Why does exposure to a novel open field enhance weak mem-
ory of a separate experience like contextual fear extinction? The
answer may lie in an evolving neurobiological view of how salient
experiences strengthen memory for weakly learned experiences
occurring around the same time. Frey and Morris (1997) pro-
posed a process by which action potentials at a synapse induce
an early phase of long-term potentiation (LTP) that initiates a
local synaptic tag. This tag represents the potential for lasting
change, but only if it is ‘‘captured’’ by plasticity-related proteins
required for late LTP and thus long-termmemory. These proteins
can be induced by activity in a shared neural ensemble prior or
following initiation of the tag, in a time delimited manner (see
Redondo and Morris, 2011 for review).
One way such ‘‘synaptic tagging’’ may work at the behavioral
level is that ‘‘strong’’ experiences boost consolidation for weakly
learned behavioral experiences occurring around the same time
and that involve similar neural substrates. For instance, novelty
exploration benefits long-term memory for weakly learned hip-
pocampal-dependent tasks like context conditioning (Ballarini
et al., 2009), context extinction (de Carvalho Myskiw et al.,
2013), object recognition (Ballarini et al., 2009), and inhibitory
avoidance (Moncada et al., 2011). Critically, exploration of novel,
but not familiar, environments upregulates immediate-early gene
expression (Li et al., 2003) and dopamine release in the CA1 re-
gion of the dorsal hippocampus (Lisman et al., 2011). Indeed,
exposure to a familiar open field, blockade of protein synthesis
in CA1, or blockade of hippocampal D1/D5 dopamine receptors
before or following novelty exposure prevents behavioral tagging
effects (de Carvalho Myskiw et al., 2013; Moncada et al., 2011).
As behavioral tagging effects may be a general process of long-
termmemory consolidation across species (Ballarini et al., 2009;
Dunsmoor et al., 2015b), one intriguing possibility to enhance
extinction is to combine extinction with other novel or rewarding
tasks that recruit regions involved in extinction consolidation, likeNeuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 57
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Perspectivethe vmPFC. In line with this idea, post-extinction administration
of L-DOPA has been shown to strengthen extinction in rats
and humans (Haaker et al., 2013).
Stressor Controllability and Active Avoidance
It has long been known that exposure to uncontrollable stress
later results in a host of maladaptive behavioral responses and
health consequences (i.e., learned helplessness; Maier and
Seligman, 1976). Less known is that exposure to controllable
stress can enhance behavioral performance and neurochemical
responses to subsequent stress (Williams and Maier, 1977).
More recently, it has been demonstrated that the benefits of
stressor controllability extends to enhanced extinction learning
and reduced spontaneous recovery, relative to no-stress con-
trols (Baratta et al., 2007). In these paradigms, stress is opera-
tionalized as exposure to shocks that the animal can either avoid
(escapable shock [ES]) or not (inescapable shock [IS]). Using a
triadic design that included ES, IS, and no shock groups, Baratta
et al. (2007) found that a session of ES in a different context 24 hr
after fear conditioning facilitated subsequent extinction learning
relative to IS and control groups and eliminated spontaneous re-
covery. A similar study in humans found that an ES session a
week prior to fear conditioning, extinction, and a spontaneous
recovery test also enhanced extinction relative to IS and control
groups and eliminated spontaneous recovery (Hartley et al.,
2014). Stressor controllability effects have been shown to
depend on plasticity within the vmPFC, which facilitates inhibi-
tory control over brainstem nuclei and the amygdala (Maier
and Watkins, 2010). Injecting muscimol into the vmPFC during
ES eliminates any benefit on later conditioned fear expression
(Baratta et al., 2007). These results suggest that stressor control-
lability may augment extinction via a general, lasting facilitation
of the mechanisms of fear inhibition.
Similar effects of reducing fear recovery occur in studies of
active avoidance. In signaled active avoidance, after fear condi-
tioning a rodent learns a behavioral response in the presence of
the CS to avoid the US (Moscarello and LeDoux, 2013). In
escape from fear, a rodent learns a behavioral response to avoid
the CS (Cain and LeDoux, 2007). Interestingly, compared to
rodents who undergo standard extinction training, both of these
paradigms result in the elimination of later spontaneous recov-
ery, even though during the spontaneous recovery test there
was no opportunity to avoid the US or CS. In other words, the
active avoidance experience during extinction, like stressor
controllability, enhances future fear control. Furthermore, Mo-
scarello and LeDoux (2013) showed that injection of a protein
synthesis inhibitor into either IL or CE impaired or facilitated
active avoidance, respectively. These data support a model in
which active avoidance learning recruits IL to inhibit CE-medi-
ated conditioned fear behaviors, leading to a robust suppression
of conditioned responding that generalizes across contexts.
Although on the surface it may seem that active avoidance
paradigms could result in protection from extinction in which a
new behavior that eliminates the CS or US prevents extinction
learning (see Psychological and Cognitive Factors for a descrip-
tion), recent research on stressor controllability suggests a
key difference between the augmentation of extinction with
active avoidance and the impairment of extinction observed in
protection from extinction paradigms is the subjective percep-58 Neuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.tion of internal control in eliminating the presentation of the
CS or US (Hartley et al., 2014). In active avoidance and stressor
controllability, the source of eliminating the aversive event is
attributed to the learned actions of the animal, whereas in pro-
tection from extinction, the source is attributed to external cir-
cumstances.
Pharmacological Enhancement
Over the last decade, a broad range of neuropharmacological
tools has been suggested to enhance learning and memory
processes during extinction to help prevent the return of extin-
guished behavior. These include agents acting on a variety of
neurotransmitter systems, including modulation of glutamater-
gic and GABAergic receptors, and modulators of the mono-
amine, cholinergic, cannabinoid, and steroid hormone systems
(see Fitzgerald et al., 2014 for a full review). As our understanding
of the cellular and systems neuroscience of fear extinction im-
proves even further through the use of tools with temporal and
spatial precision like optogenetics (Do-Monte et al., 2015), phar-
macological agents will become increasingly directed to specific
neural targets to modulate extinction learning. As it currently
stands, pharmaceutical adjuncts to extinction learning in hu-
mans tend to incorporate systematic administration of putative
cognitive enhancers, most prominently the partial NMDA agonist
D-cycloserine (DCS).
In rodents, both systematic administration of DCS or infusion
into the BLA directly either before or after extinction training en-
hances learning (Fitzgerald et al., 2014). These findings have
been translated to the clinic-based exposure therapies in hu-
mans. For example, in an initial demonstration, patients suffering
from acrophobia (fear or heights) who were given DCS showed
similar improvement in symptoms after two exposure therapy
sessions, as participants given a placebo demonstrated
after seven sessions (Ressler et al., 2004). Since this study, the
benefits of DCS in augmenting exposure therapy has been docu-
mented for a number of different anxiety disorders, although its
efficacy may be limited to clinically significant disorders and
initial exposure training (see Myers et al., 2011 for a review).
Improving Retrieval of the Extinction Memory
Finally, a complementary approach to strengthening within-ses-
sion extinction learning is to promote the retrieval of extinction
memories at test. In the memory literature, retrieval is enhanced
if the encoding and retrieval context are similar, an effect known
as encoding specificity (Tulving and Thomson, 1973). Hence, the
goal of these approaches, broadly speaking, is to enhance sim-
ilarity to extinction training so that retrieval favors the inhibitory
CS-no US association and not the original CS-US association.
Retrieval Cues
One approach to promote retrieval of the extinction memory is
to place a cue at extinction that is also present at test. Using
appetitive conditioning in rats, Brooks and Bouton showed that
extinction cues reduce spontaneous recovery (Brooks and Bou-
ton, 1993) and renewal (Brooks and Bouton, 1994). However, the
mechanisms by which extinction retrieval cues function to
reduce the return of fear are not entirely clear. From an associa-
tive learning framework, extinction cues may act as occasion
setters helping to retrieve the CS-no US association. But extinc-
tion cues may also become conditioned inhibitors (‘‘safety
Neuron
Perspectivesignals’’) that could interfere with effective extinction (Lovibond
et al., 2000; Rescorla, 2003). Additional steps can help ensure
that extinction cues do not turn into conditioned inhibitors. For
instance, Brooks and Bouton (1993, 1994) paired extinction
cues with the CS on some, but not all extinction, trials. Addition-
ally, the extinction cue was presented several seconds prior to
the CS and the two stimuli did not overlap. This also avoided
the potential for the CS to be processed as an entirely unique
cue. In sum, retrieval cues may be most effective as reminders
of the extinction session, helping ‘‘bridge’’ extinction and test
(Laborda et al., 2011).
Multiple Contexts
Another approach to reduce the contextual specificity of fear
extinction is to conduct extinction across multiple contexts.
From the point of view of latent cause models, the rationale for
this is to increase thescopeandgenerality of theextinctioncause,
so that it matches many contexts and is not tied to a single one.
Accordingly, relative to single context extinction, multi-context
extinction reduces fear renewal (e.g., Gunther et al., 1998; Shiban
et al., 2013) and reinstatement (Dunsmoor et al., 2014). In
essence, extinctionundermultiple contexts increases thechance
that cues present at extinction will be present at test, therefore
promoting generalization, similar to the use of extinction cues.
Extinction over multiple contexts may also reduce the chance
that the context would acquire inhibitory properties and block
the CS from complete extinction. As compared to extinction in
a single context, switchingbetweencontextsmayalsohelpmain-
tain the high associability of the CS, as well as increase novelty—
processes also in line with strengthening learning.
Silencing the Hippocampus
The dorsal hippocampus gates expression of the extinction
memory so that extinction is usually confined to the context
where it occurred (Maren et al., 2013). One technique to reduce
the context specificity of extinction is to therefore temporarily
inactivate or impair the function of the hippocampus. In rats,
reversible inactivation of the dorsal hippocampus with muscimol
after extinction training, prior to test, prevented fear renewal to
an extinguished CS when it was tested in a novel environment
but did not prevent renewal in the acquisition context (reviewed
in Bouton et al., 2006). The latter finding was consistent with
earlier studies showing that permanent hippocampal lesions
made prior to fear conditioning did not prevent renewal when
tested in the acquisition context (Frohardt et al., 2000; Wilson
et al., 1995). Yet, in another study, permanent electrolytic lesions
to the dorsal hippocampus in rats, either prior to fear condition-
ing or following extinction, reduced fear renewal to the CS irre-
spective of the test context (Ji and Maren, 2005).
In humans, methods that are more practical include pharma-
cological manipulations with minimal risk. One potential agent
is scopolamine, a cholinergic antagonist used to treat motion
sickness that also disrupts context-dependent learning in rats
(Anagnostaras et al., 1995). Pharmacological disruption of the
hippocampus with scopolamine prevents renewal in rats when
administered prior, but not following extinction (Zelikowsky
et al., 2013). Disrupting the hippocampus during extinction
may prevent the context from being fully processed, making
learning context independent and therefore resilient to context
shifts. Whether procedures that target hippocampal activity,like pre-extinction administration of scopolamine, are effective
in humans awaits study.
Conclusions
Extinction of conditioned responses is one of the oldest andmost
widely known findings from psychological science. And yet
researchers continue to make new discoveries that illuminate
behavioral and neurobiological mechanisms underlying the
disruption of prior learning. Important questions remain, but a
surge of interest in extinction across a number of psychological
and neuroscience domains have started to tackle issues relevant
to the disruption of unwanted behaviors and persistent alteration
of fear memories. In this Perspective, we highlighted advances in
our understanding of extinction anddiscussed areas thatwarrant
a re-examination. This includes the question of whether extinc-
tion always yields a new inhibitory memory trace that competes
against the original CS-US association, and what conditions
lead to persistent alteration of a memory trace. Beyond targeting
the original memory trace, a host of recently developed tech-
niques can compensate for the shortfalls of traditional extinction
protocols as a tool to prevent the return of fear. These techniques
have clear implications for improving clinical treatment for fear
and anxiety disorders. Finally, these techniques, together with
new statistical conceptualizations of learning and unlearning,
can illuminate central mechanisms implicated in learning and
memory above and beyond the phenomenon of extinction.
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